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The Unbearable Whiteness of the Polish Plumber 
and the Hungarian Peacock Dance around “Race”
József Böröcz and Mahua Sarkar
Whiteness is inherently unstable, heterogeneous, and impure.1 So is “eastern 
Europe.”2 Making matters worse, the moral-geopolitical construct of a hyper-
real “Europe,” rampant in post-WWII western Europe, has come to connote a 
claim to two global monopolies.3 One is an increasingly exclusive entitlement 
to “racial whiteness.”4 Another, a claim of unique, essential “goodness.”5 The 
reverse-synecdochic practice of labeling (putatively both white and benign) 
western Europe as “Europe” serves to conceal the many falsehoods, contra-
dictions, and conflicts that inhere in that monopoly claim.
Given all that, May 1, 2004—the date of the diffident but resolute “acces-
sion” of eight erstwhile-state-socialist “east European” states to the European 
Union—definitely spelled trouble.6 Thirteen of the fifteen established member 
states of the EU announced that access to their labor markets for citizens of 
the new member states would be delayed by seven years after “accession,” 
signaling some of the complications that lay ahead.7 The economic grounds 
1. See Joseph Pugliese, “Race as Category Crisis: Whiteness and the Topical Assigna-
tion of Race.” Social Semiotics 12, no. 2 (August 2002): 149–168, Iga Mergler, “White Or 
Not White? The Racial Representations of the Poles in the British Media after 2004” (PhD 
Diss., Central European University, Budapest, 2004); Chris Ruiz-Velasco, “Order Out of 
Chaos: Whiteness, White Supremacy, and Thomas Dixon, Jr.” College Literature 34, no. 4 
(Fall 2007): 151; Patricia de Santana Pinho, “White but Not Quite: Tones and Overtones of 
Whiteness in Brazil,” Small Axe 29, no. 2 (July 2009): 44, Pugliese, “Race as Category Cri-
sis”; Helen Moore, “Shades of Whiteness? English Villagers, Eastern European Migrants 
and the Intersection of Race and Class in Rural England,” Critical Race and Whiteness 
Studies 9, no. 1 (2013) at http://acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/191Moore20131.pdf (last 
accessed February 20, 2017).
2. Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the 
Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994); Anita Starosta, Form and Instability: Eastern Europe, Lit-
erature, Postimperial Difference (Evanston, IL, 2016).
3. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, (Princeton, N.J, 2000), 66.
4. Alastair Bonnett, “Who Was White? The Disappearance of Non-European White 
Identities and the Formation of European Racial Whiteness,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, 
no. 6 (November 1998): 1029–55.
5. József Böröcz, “Goodness Is Elsewhere: The Rule of European Difference.” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 48, no. 1 (January 2006): 110–38.
6. József Böröcz “East European Entrants to EU: Diffidently Yours.” The Polish Foreign 
Affairs Digest 3, no. 4(9), (2003): 47–58.
7. Britain and Ireland were the only west European EU-member states that did not 
delay access to their labor markets to citizens of the new member states. See József Böröcz 
and Mahua Sarkar, “What Is the EU?” International Sociology 20, no. 2 (June 2005): 153–73, 
Dóra Husz and Dorothee Bohle, “Whose Europe Is It? Interest Group Action in Accession 
Negotiations: The Cases of Competition Policy and Labor Migration,” Politique europée-
nne 1, No. 15 (2005): 85–112; Thomas Plümper and Christina J. Schneider, “Discriminatory 
European Union Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51, no. 4 (August 2007): 568–87; József Böröcz, “The Collapse of State 
Socialism in the Soviet Bloc and Global Labor Migration” in Mary Rowlinson, Wim Vande-
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for such temporary restrictions on labor inflows are widely known to be shaky 
at best: there is near-consensus in the scholarly literature that “[t]he highest 
[national economic] gains from post-accession [movement of east European 
labor] were achieved by the United Kingdom and Ireland, which opened their 
labor markets for mobile workers from [the new member states] already in 
2004.8 That of course has practically no bearing on west “European public 
opinion”—a body whose members are, for the most part, supportive of “their” 
governments’ delaying tactics.9
Meanwhile, the removal of the recently-attained formal sovereignties of 
the former-state-socialist-”bloc” societies—a generic requirement for mem-
bership in the “sharing and pooling” of sovereignties that the EU represents—
began a good ten to fifteen years earlier, in the early nineties, at the point 
where their freshly post-state-socialist political elites made a commitment 
to pursuing full membership in the European Union.10 Given the powerful 
emotive significance of having been “robbed” of sovereignty by the Soviet-
centered geopolitical project, the “handing-over” of formal sovereignties 
to the EU was bound to be a political minefield. The current success of the 
nationalist Right in east-central Europe can be seen as a consequence—at 
least in part—of the widespread critique, if not demonization, of the liberal 
governments that managed the accession process.
It is in this context, seven months after “accession” and almost six and a 
half years before the expiry of the “transitional arrangements” barring east 
European labor from the right to employment in the earlier fifteen member 
states of the European Union, that the French magazine Charlie Hébdo pub-
lished a satirical article by Philippe Val.11 The article proposed the ostensibly 
hilarious and bizarre idea that “a Polish plumber or an Estonian architect 
could move to other [member states of the EU] to offer their services” at 
prices that would presumably undercut local markets.12 Indeed, as Philippe 
kerchkove, Ronald M. S. Commers, and Tim Johnston, eds., Labor and Global Justice: Es-
says on the Ethics of Labor Practices under Globalization (New York, 2014), 85–104.
8. Agnieszka Fihel, Anna Janicka, Paweł Kaczmarczyk and Joanna Nestorowicz, Free 
Movement of Workers and Transitional Arrangements: Lessons from the 2004 and 2007 
Enlargements (Warsaw, 2015) at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277475204_
Free_movement_of_workers_and_transitional_arrangements_lessons_from_the_2004_
and_2007_enlargements (last accessed March 5, 2017).
9. See, e.g., Natalie Schimmel, “Welcome to Europe, But Please Stay Out: Freedom 
of Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the European Union,” Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 24, no. 3 (2006): 760–800, at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/
vol24/iss3/1 (last accessed February 20, 2017).
10. See, e.g., Böröcz and Sarkar, “What Is the EU?”; Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement 
of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe (Cambridge, 
UK, 2004).
11. Val is a noted journalist and a singer who joined, a few weeks after the brutal 
attack on the editorial offices of Charlie Hébdo, the extreme-right organization Front 
National. See “Philippe Val, ex-Charlie Hebdo, Rejoint l’Aile Droite du Front National,” 
Égalité & Réconciliation, November 17, 2015, at www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Philippe-
Val-ex-Charlie-Hebdo-rejoint-l-aile-droite-du-Front-national-36176.html (last accessed 
February 20, 2017).
12. Matteo Gnes, “European Legal Integration? New Possibilities for EU and Non-
EU Citizens?” in Lucica Matei, ed., Normativity, Fundamental Rights, and Legal Order in 
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de Villiers, a spokesman for and unsuccessful presidential candidate of the 
French xenophobic right put it in a subsequent interview in Le Figaro, the 
fear was that they would do so “at the salary and rules of social protections 
of [their countries] of origin.”13 De Villiers did not bother to explain why he 
thought east European businesses would not adjust their prices and salaries 
upward, to approximate those prevailing in the French market. Nor did any-
one seem to pose that question to him.
A relatively jovial public give-and-take followed, including an interven-
tion by former EU Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein, who committed the faux-
pas of openly contemplating the possibility that even he might hire a Polish 
plumber to do some work in his house in northern France, given the difficul-
ties of finding a good professional locally.14 Bolkenstein seemed to be making 
an abstract, properly EU-“liberal” point by highlighting a set of possibilities 
that nonetheless appeared to have been largely hypothetical at the time.15 
The subsequent referendum, held on May 29, 2005, on the European Union’s 
Constitutional Treaty that proposed de-nationalization of hitherto member-
state-level authority to regulate services, was defeated in France as it was 
seen a threat to the “French (and ‘European’) social model.”16 It was likewise 
defeated in the Netherlands three days later.17 It would seem that the trope 
of the Polish Plumber played quite a historic role in holding back the post-
“nation-state” transformation of western Europe.18
It would be easy to claim that, in the French debates, the Polish Plumber 
served as a “symbol of wild liberalization and of the invasion of hungry and 
underpaid workers, willing to work at any hour of day and night in order to 
earn a few Euro.”19 However, is that reading—condescending and disparag-
ing as it is of “Poles” (indeed, by extension, of “east Europeans”) along class, 
gender and ethnic lines—exhaustive of the culture-productive capacity of 
this trope?
The response of the Polish government that followed the French discus-
sions would seem to suggest otherwise. We focus here on the two versions 
the EU / Normativité, droits fundamentaux et ordre juridique dans l’UE, “The Dialogues 
of EPLO at NSPSPA” Series, No.1/2010 (Bucharest, 2010) at http://aei.pitt.edu/14411/1/
Normativity%5B1%5D_Lucica_Matei.pdf (last accessed February 20, 2017), 52.
13. “. . . la directive Bolkestein permet à un plombier polonais ou à un architecte 
 estonien de proposer ses services en France, au salaire et avec les règles de protection 
sociale de leur pays d’origine.” See Philippe de Villiers, Interview, March 15, 2005, in 
“ Villiers: “La grande triche du oui,” Le Figaro, March 15, 2005. For an English version, see 
Claudia Sternberg, “What Were the French Telling Us by Voting Down the ‘EU Constitu-
tion’? A case for interpretive research on referendum research,” Comparative European 
Politics (October 2015): 14.
14. Gnes, “European Legal Integration?,” 53.
15. Sternberg, “What were the French,” 2.
16. Gnes, “European Legal Integration?,” 53.
17. There are serious issues with the scope of validity of the terminology of “the Euro-
pean social model”—see József Böröcz, “Global Inequality in Redistribution: For A World-
Historical Sociology of (Not) Caring,” Intersections—East European Journal of Sociology 
and Politics 2, no. 2 (2016): 57–83.
18. I will capitalize the Polish Plumber as a referent to a trope.
19. Gnes, “European Legal Integration? . . .” p. 53.
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of a poster that the National Tourist Office of Poland published in this con-
text.20 Both depicted a handsome, blond male model posing with plumbing 
equipment in front of some of Poland’s iconic tourist sites. One read “Welcome 
to Poland.”21 The other announced, “I’m staying in Poland—come in large 
numbers!”22 (See Figure 1 above.) Having “reversed,” so to speak, the thrust 
of the French anxiety over the “invasion” of Polish working class men, the 
20. See “Un Bon Tuyau de l’Office du Turisme Polonais,” Vanksen, June 16, 2005, at 
http://www.vanksen.fr/blog/un-bon-tuyau-de-loffice-du-tourisme-polonais/ (last ac-
cessed February 20, 2017).
21. https://c2.staticflickr.com/4/3177/2595175298_611c1c397c.jpg (last accessed March 
2, 2017).
22. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/cc/Polish_Plumber.jpg (last 
 accessed March 2, 2017).
Figure 1. “I’m Staying in Poland. Come in Large Numbers.” Travel  advertisement, 
produced, and reproduced here by  permission, by the Polish Office for 
 Tourism. Source: http://media3.s- nbcnews.com/j/msnbc/Components/ 
Photos/050629/050629_polish_hmed_330a.grid-6×2.jpg (last accessed 
 February 3, 2017).
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poster thus acquired a life of its own on social media, and seemed to diffuse, 
with humor, the tension that inhered in the French discussion. Soon, the mat-
ter seemed to subside into a more general discussion about nationalist ver-
sus liberal conceptions of statehood and the place of France in the European 
Union.
But let us take a closer look at the terms in which this “turning around” of 
the discourse was affected. How might we read what the figure of the Polish 
plumber evinces in these posters? One striking feature is of course his unmis-
takable blondness, eerily reminiscent of the “Aryan” male figures in the pro-
paganda pamphlets from 1930s Germany. Read in this context, the message 
of the second poster—“come in large numbers”—is similarly disturbing, har-
kening back, perhaps unwittingly, to a very different European “union” (the 
appropriately color-coded Plan Weiß—the Nazi German military code name of 
the invasion of Poland) not so long ago.
Perhaps the more obvious message that the Polish Government intended 
to highlight through these posters was the allure of working class Polish 
maleness—robust, self-confident and brawny, reminiscent even of the title of 
Andrzej Wajda’s Man of Iron, but now clean, blond, and most importantly, 
inviting. Seen from this vantage point, the poster’s message—“come in large 
numbers”—is suggestive of yet another kind of possible union; the strategic 
placement of multiple phallic objects on the posters’ visualscape underscor-
ing the sexual innuendos inherent in the message. And through this sexual-
ization of the working-class male subject, expression of ethnonational pride 
(“I’m staying here”), and the “Nordic” self-representation of Polish maleness, 
we get a glimpse of the reactive formation of a particular kind of east European 
subjecthood: inviting, ready for consumption, west-compatible, and “White.”
Needless to say, the matter did not end there and, in due course, the alle-
gorical figure of the Polish Plumber crossed the English Channel. During the 
entire period from the formal “accession” of the eight erstwhile-state-socialist 
states to the EU on May 1, 2004 (and the birth of the Polish Plumber in Paris later 
in the same year) to the “Brexit” vote of June 23, 2016, the increasingly demon-
ized figure of the east-European-worker dominated discursive space about 
labor policy, social rights, and eventually, European Union membership. 
All that culminated in the “Brexit” decision, causing the collapse of the Tory 
government, possibly foreshadowing Scotland’s secession from the UK, and 
unleashing a crisis of governance both in London and Brussels. The tone of the 
British conversation was considerably more ferocious than the French.23 The 
frequency of acts of physical violence against Poles increased dramatically.24 
23. See Zack Beauchamps, “Brexit Isn’t about Economics. It is about Xenophobia,” Vox, 
last modified June 24, 2016, at www.vox.com/2016/6/23/12005814/brexit-eu- referendum-
immigrants (last accessed February 21), especially the example of anti-Polish graffiti.
24. Between 2004 and 2014, there had been an estimated “tenfold rise in attacks” 
against Poles in Great Britain, see Johnny McDevitt, “New Figures Reveal Dramatic 
 Increase in Hate Crimes against Polish People,” The Guardian, June 11, 2014, at www.
theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/11/polish-people-rise-in-attacks-blame-recession-
politicians-media (last accessed February 21, 2017). On August 29, 2016, a Polish man was 
killed in Harlow, Essex. News reports suggest it may have happened because he spoke 
Polish in public. See Ben Quinn, “Six Teenage Boys Arrested over Death of Polish Man in 
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A single-cause political party was built on anti-east-European-“immigrant” 
rhetoric, and significant portions of otherwise non-extreme-right-identified 
voters were persuaded by it enough to sacrifice their unrestricted access to 
the large space of the European Union for the dubious comfort of seeing the 
“Polish Plumber deported.”25
The presence of European labor in the British labor market since 2004—
again, the UK was one of the two EU-member states that did not delay opening 
its labor market to citizens of the new member states—has unleashed multi-
dimensional processes of racialization. As Jon Fox, Laura Moroşanu, and 
Eszter Szilassy argue very usefully, racialization is “the socially constructed 
contingent outcome of processes and practices of exclusion” wherein “the cat-
egory of ‘race’ is invoked and evoked in discursive and institutional practices 
to interpret, order, and indeed structure social relations.”26 To be clear, as Fox, 
Moroşanu, and Szilassy point out further, “the nominal absence of somatic 
difference does not get in the way of xenophobic racism; it turns out racialized 
difference can be invented in situ.”27 The Polish poster featuring a “Nordic” 
Polish Plumber can only go so far in “fixing” the “race” doubts about east 
Europeans in the British context. If anything, as the analysis here suggests, it 
may well have been wishful, even audacious, thinking.
At the heart of the issue lies, of course, the question of the “content” of 
whiteness in contemporary western Europe. Previous work on the histori-
cal dynamics of whiteness has shown that its borders are semi-permeable 
for groups construed as “just outside” of it. Based mainly on stylized repre-
sentations of collective “single-ethnicity” stories in the United States, a con-
siderable literature has sprouted around the notion of “becoming White.”28 
However, the migration within the European context is somewhat different 
from the history of European immigration to the US: for, in the EU, both the 
“destination” and the migrant-emitting societies share membership in the 
same public authority, which provides them at least nominally equal rights to 
travel, work, study, relocate to, and live anywhere within that shared space.
As a matter of fact, questions can be raised about the very applicability of 
even the term “(im)migrants” and “(im)migration” with respect to Europeans 
moving within the EU. This is not a pedantic, scholarly quibble: at a press 
conference held jointly with then British Prime Minister David Cameron in 
Essex,” The Guardian, August 30, 2016 at www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/30/
five-teenage-boys-arrested-after-man-dies-following-attack-in-essex (last accessed Feb-
ruary 21, 2017).
25. Nick Robinson, “UKIP: Should the Polish Plumber Be Deported?” BBC News, No-
vember 19, 2014, at www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30118855 (last accessed February 21, 
2017).
26. Jon Fox, Laura Moroşanu and Eszter Szilassy, “The Racialization of the New Euro-
pean Migration to the UK,” Sociology 46, no. 4 (August 2012): 681–82.
27. Ibid., 682.
28. See Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race 
in America (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998); James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “How White 
People became White,” in Paula Rothenberg, ed., White Privilege: Essential Readings on 
the Other Side of Racism (New York, 2002), 29–34; Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish became 
White, (New York, 2009); Jennifer Guglielmo and Salvatore Salerno, Are Italians White? 
How Race is Made in America (New York, 2003).
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Budapest in January 2016, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán repudi-
ated a journalist who referred to Hungarians working and living in the UK 
as “migrants”: “For us, it is very important that we are not considered as 
migrants.29 Words matter here. We would like to make it quite clear that we 
are not migrants into [sic] the U.K. We are the citizens of a state that belongs to 
the European Union who can take jobs anywhere freely within the European 
Union.”30
As in the Polish Plumber discussion in France and (even more so) in the 
UK, there seems to be a palpable element of “racial” downgrading inherent 
in the label “migrant,” and the Prime Minister seems keen to extricate the 
ethnonational category he represents (“Hungarians”) from that discounted, 
racialized location that it has been assigned in at least some influential west 
European discussions of EU policy on the ostensibly “free movement of per-
sons.” The need for such distancing seems to be even more urgent today in the 
post-refugee-crisis context in Hungary, where the word “migráns” (“migrant”) 
has acquired particularly negative overtones.31
In the early spring of 2015—when the news of the imminent arrival of 
large groups of people displaced by the west Asian wars reached Europe—the 
governments of eastern Europe were deeply mired in a complex set of asym-
metrical relations with their west European partners and the EU as a whole. 
A pervasive sense of economic, political, and cultural dependency (includ-
ing direct economic dependence on worker remittances from the western 
EU, not to mention an almost total dependence on the EU for infrastructural 
development funds) was already a fact—but perhaps most challenging was 
the widely felt, implicit lack of acceptance as equals in all matters European. 
In this sense, Poland is only one—albeit, in terms of its population, the larg-
est—of the racialized and degraded east European entrants to the EU-sphere. 
Partly due to linguistic reasons, partly because of the UK government’s early 
decision not to qualify their access to the British economy, a large part of east 
European labor has been in the UK for several years—the country where the 
racialization of east European foreign labor has taken most explicit forms 
recently.
It seems, therefore, that there is something to be gained in trying to situ-
ate the widely noted and deplored negative positioning of the government 
of Hungary with respect to the refugee influx within the racialized context 
29. Notice the use of the first person plural to citizens of Hungary who live and work 
in the United Kingdom, quite a powerful claim of ethnonational unity, intended for the 
 Hungarian media consumer. The legal argument is of course also unassailable. The 
“trick” is in switching from a commonplace, everyday conversation to a rather technical 
legal point.
30. Paul Dallison, “Orbán to Cameron: ‘We Are Not Parasites’ British Prime Min-
ister Seeks Hungarian Support for Migrant Benefits Curbs,” Politico, January 7, 2016 at 
www.politico.eu/article/orban-cameron-not-parasites-hungary-united-kingdom-brexit- 
migration-refugee/ (last accessed February 21, 2017).
31. “Nekünk nagyon fontos, hogy ne tekintsenek bennünket migránsoknak.” 
Text of Orbán’s reply, as reported in the Hungarian media. See “Orbán szerint a mag-
yarok nem migránsok Angliában,” Origo, January 7, 2016, at www.origo.hu/itthon/
percrolpercre/20160107-david-cameron-orban-viktor-budapest-sajtotajekoztato.html 
(last accessed February 21, 2017).
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outlined above. For the arrival of relatively large numbers of displaced people 
seems to have provided an excellent opportunity to the governments of east-
ern Europe to stake out their claim, once and for all, to essential, unquestion-
able whiteness. The expectation seems to be that the discursive denigration 
of the “Arab,” “Muslim” “migrants” (as well as the institutional indifference 
to their suffering) would somehow shore up the essential whiteness and 
Christian-ness of Hungarians (east Europeans). Certainly, Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán’s performance—his own “peacock dance”—as a pan-
European white supremacist appears, in this context, as a strategy devised 
to enhance his and his government’s “whiteness” credentials.32 It is possible 
that this reading explains in part the overwhelming support Orbán’s anti-ref-
ugee, anti-human-rights policy seems to enjoy among the Hungarian public.
Being treated with ambiguity, being kept in liminal, borderline status, and 
being constantly questioned, let alone accused of lacking certain essential 
“European” cultural qualities along “racial” lines is of course a shared experi-
ence for a great majority of humankind. Whiteness is a key instrument for the 
propagation of that cognitive schema. What is somewhat unique about the 
position of eastern Europe in the world today is that, as citizens of EU-member 
states, many inhabitants of the region perceive the European Union, rightly or 
wrongly, as a resource that offers them an opportunity to boost their “racial” 
credentials, that is, a chance to proceed “upward” on the scale of privilege 
in an obviously unequal, oppressive and discriminatory system. Hence, they 
cheer and applaud their Prime Minister’s “peacock dance” around “race,” 
without considering the genocidal “downside” of their positioning. The alter-
native—taking an anti-racist, system-critical position regarding the world—
appears to be unthinkable in a post-state-socialist context, exorcised of the 
supposed evil of progressive, Left politics.
32. Sometime in early June 2012, Orbán made a set of disparaging remarks about 
the deep dishonesty of European politics as a fanciful, implicit bargaining process. He 
referred to the whole process as “pávatánc”—i.e., a “peacock dance.” See Tóth Ákos 
“ Pávatánc,” Népszabadaság Online, June 4, 2012, at http://nol.hu/velemeny/20120604-
pavatanc-1312137 (last accessed February 21, 2017).
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